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Abstract: This paper studies FDI spatial spillovers in China. Empirical investigation reveals that, 
along the spatial dimension, FDI presence tends to generate negative intra-regional spillovers that 
dominate other potential positive externalities. The direction, magnitude and scope of inter-regional 
spillovers vary, depending on the spillover channels. Our empirical findings call for a rethinking of 
policy-driven agglomeration among indigenous firms and MNEs in developing countries.  
 
Key Words: FDI spillovers; Spatial diffusion; Firm Agglomeration; China     
JEL Classification: R12, F21, O33 
	  
	  
* We would like to thank Professor Cheng Hsiao for technical advice on spatial dynamic panel econometric method. 
Helpful comments for earlier versions of the paper have been received from Chia-Hui Lu, Larry Qiu, Eden S.H. Yu and 
seminar participants at City University of Hong Kong, Tsinghua University, University of Waterloo, and Wilfrid 
Laurier University. All remaining errors are our own. This work is supported by the Research Center of International 
Economics of City University of Hong Kong (Project No. 7010009). 
 
 
Correspondences:  
Mi Lin, Lincoln Business School, University of Lincoln, UK. Email: linmixm@gmail.com. 
Yum K. Kwan, Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong. Email: efykkwan@cityu.edu.hk. 
 
 
2	  
	  
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been a major influence on the world economy and the 
focus of considerable attention. Such enterprises have been at the center of wide-ranging debates 
both within home countries and in recipient nations. In recipient nations, for example, apart from 
macroeconomic issues such as tax revenues, employment, exports and economic growth, it is 
argued that foreign direct investment (FDI) may potentially influence indigenous firms through 
various spillover effects (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). Over the past two decades, both academic 
researchers and policy-makers have paid a great deal of attention to FDI spillovers that occur 
particularly in developing countries. Based on the fact that MNEs on average possess superior 
technologies or knowledge capital, policy-makers in developing countries seem to take it for 
granted that there will be beneficial spillovers from MNEs to nearby indigenous firms. Relatively 
little attention has been paid to the issue of potential negative spillovers.  In this study, by exploiting 
very detailed location information of manufacturing firms in China, we provide empirical evidence 
showing that negative FDI spillovers can be substantial along the spatial dimension. 
  Many studies investigate FDI spillovers in the context of firm or industry agglomeration. This is 
motivated by the Marshallian notion that firms tend to agglomerate in specific areas so as to reduce 
transaction cost and enjoy external economies. It is well documented in the existing literature that 
the location of MNEs exhibits similar self-reinforcing pattern not just along the geographical but 
also the temporal and sectoral dimensions (see, among others, Head et al., 1995; Cheng and Kwan, 
2000a, 2000b; Blonigen et al., 2005; Lin and Kwan, 2011). While this line of literature tends to 
gravitate on the notion that agglomeration promotes spillovers, the direction and magnitude of the 
association between geographical distance and spillovers, however, is not as clear as one would 
expect.  
  The knowledge diffusion literature has long documented the co-existence of both positive and 
negative spillovers in the context of firm agglomeration. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Gertler 
(2003) emphasize that knowledge diffusion is highly sensitive to geographical distance and that 
proximity promotes knowledge spillovers. Boschma and Frenken (2010), Broekel and Boschma 
(2012), and Cassi and Plunket (2013) provide empirical evidence for the prevalence of the so-called 
proximity paradox, which states that while proximity in various dimensions (geographical, 
cognitive, organizational, and social) may be a driver for agents to connect and exchange 
knowledge, too much proximity in any of the dimensions could result in substantially weakened or 
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even negative innovative performance and spillovers. It has also been argued that congestion 
pricing may come along with agglomeration, as excess demand would boost local cost for land, 
labor, and even public goods, thereby generating negative pecuniary externalities onto the firms.   
Consequently, while geographical proximity between MNEs and indigenous firms may facilitate 
knowledge diffusion and hence increase the likelihood of positive spillovers, it can also bring along 
negative spillovers that adversely affect the performance of indigenous firms (Görg and Greenaway, 
2004; Görg and Strobl, 2005).  
  Many empirical analyses in the literature treat each region as an isolated entity. The role of 
spatial dependence is completely ignored, even though it has been found to be an important force in 
the process of productivity growth (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Madriaga and Poncet, 2007). In the 
context of FDI spillovers, there is no reason why MNCs located in a particular region can only 
generate spillovers onto indigenous firms collocated in the same region. Similarly, intra- and inter-
regional spillovers can also occur among indigenous firms. The pitfalls of ignoring these spatial 
interactions, if they actually exist in the data, have also been well documented in the econometric 
literature (Anselin, 2001). These considerations motivate us to employ in this study a spatial 
dynamic panel model with both time and spatial autoregressive terms, which simultaneously 
accounts for spatial interactions among indigenous firms as well as that between indigenous firms 
and MNEs. The model is estimated by spatial dynamic panel GMM method (Kukenova and 
Monteiro, 2009) that accounts for endogeneity and spatial dependence problems.  
  One of the unsolved issues in the FDI spillovers literature is the lack of consensus on the 
genuine mechanism of spillovers. In most early empirical studies, documented association between 
domestic firms’ productivity performance and FDI presence at most reveal a compounded effect 
summarizing both positive and negative effects from various channels. To uncover the genuine 
spillovers realization process, this compounded net effect needs to be further decomposed by 
adding more dimensions into analysis. Recent literature thus increasingly look at FDI spillovers 
through industry linkages, origin of foreign ownership, and firm heterogeneities (see Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Crespo et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2010; Hale and 
Long, 2011; Xu and Sheng, 2012, among other contributions). In this study, we attempt to identify 
different channels of FDI spillovers by using geography scope. More specifically, although it might 
be difficult to entirely decompose mixed effects from various channels, we would like to propose 
that spillovers from different channels have different geography scopes and there is a possibility 
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that one source of spillover would become dominant in either narrow or wider geography scope. 
  As documented in the literature, on the one hand, positive knowledge spillovers (skill 
acquisition) are more likely through labor turnover (Kokko, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 2002). Using 
worker flows data in Norway, Balsvik (2011) document that labor mobility from MNEs to non-
MNEs represents a true knowledge externality. Moreover, a significant part of knowledge spillovers 
are through MNCs transfer their techniques, quality systems, standardization procedures to their 
local suppliers by providing trainings to local labors (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). Markusen and 
Trofimenko (2007) document that the use of foreign experts by MNCs has substantial, although not 
always immediate, positive effects on the value added per worker of domestic firms. On the other 
hand, labor turnover could also generate negative spillovers to domestic firms when foreign firms 
poach local talents from their domestic counterparts. In terms of the geography scope of spillover 
through employment, however, the negative effect of poaching local talents are more likely to have 
narrow scope and are confounded locally. Knowledge spillovers through customer and supplier 
linkage, imitation, or the transfer of quality systems and standardization procedures nevertheless are 
less likely to be contained within a small area and thus may become dominant and be identified 
among wider geographic scope. Based on this stream of literature, we use employment of foreign 
firms as a proxy to capture FDI spillovers in the empirical model.1 Our empirical results seem to 
support this conjecture, the dominant inter-regional spillover effect captured by employment share 
of FDI increase from negative to positive when we gradually increase the geographic scope. 
  Another potential channel for FDI spillovers is through sales competition. Similar to 
employment, sales competition could potentially capture both positive spillovers, i.e., domestic 
firms are spurred to become more efficient or to upgrade their technology due to competition 
(Blomström and Kokko, 1998) or negative spillovers such as market stealing or congestion pricing 
(Aiken and Harrison, 1999; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Görg and Strobl, 2005). Our empirical 
results reveal that negative spillovers in this case are the dominant effect in both limited and wider 
geographic scopes in our study. Moreover, the negative inter-regional spillovers captured by sales 
income share of FDI become even negative when geographic scope increases. This could be due to 
the fact that negative impact of market stealing or congestion pricing are magnified through inter-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As we do not have worker flows data, we assume that there is a positive correlation between FDI employment and the 
likelihood of knowledge spillovers and thus use FDI employment share as a proxy for this channel. 
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regional trade or industry linkages and spread out in a wider geographic scope; consequently, the 
positive spillovers captured by sales income share, if exist, seem to be dominated. 
  The regional distribution of FDI in China was initially determined by government policy but 
subsequently dominated by agglomeration effect. Five coastal cities were set up as Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) in the early 1980s to attract foreign capital by exempting MNEs from taxes 
and regulations. In view of the success of this experiment, similar schemes, such as Open Coastal 
Cities (OCCs), Open Coastal Areas, Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) 
and Hi-Tech Parks, were also set up to cover broader and inner regions in later years.2 During the 
same period, due to both market- and policy-driven reasons, firm agglomeration has gradually 
become a distinguished phenomenon of China’s economy over the last 20 years.  
  Explanatory data analyses reveal strong agglomeration pattern for both MNEs location choice 
and indigenous firms’ productivity performance in China. Figure 1 presents FDI spatial density 
distribution at county level in 2007 (the last year of our sample). FDI presence is measured by fixed 
asset share of FDI firms in each county. It can be seen from the graph that, while most clusters 
remain in coastal regions, there are also clusters appearing in central and northern regions of China 
in recent years. Figure 2 illustrates productivity agglomeration among domestic private firms in 
China. As shown in the graph, highly productive domestic private firms are mainly clustering in 
central and inner regions.3 A satisfactory empirical model ought to incorporate and explain the 
agglomeration of productive domestic private firms, as well as the interactions between FDI 
penetration and indigenous firms in their underlying and neighboring regions. This justifies the use 
of spatial dynamic panel regression model as the econometric platform in this study.  
  An interesting phenomenon could be observed when we put Figure 1 and Figure 2 together, i.e., 
counties with low productive domestic private firms on average have high FDI penetration. 
Consistent with this observation from explanatory data analyses, our empirical results show that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 From 1984 to 1986, 14 Open Coastal Cities were set up in Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang provinces. To date, there are 54 national-level ETDZs located in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang (Ningbo and Hangzhou), Jilin (Changchun), Fujian (Dongshan, Fuzhou and Xiamen), Jiangxi 
(Nanchang), Jiangsu (Nanjing, Changzhou, Suzhou and Wuxi), Anhui (Wuhu), and Guangdong (Foshan, Guangzhou, 
Zhongshan, Huizhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai) etc. More detailed information can be obtained from: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/etdz/75721.htm. 
3 In this paper, we define domestic private firms as firms that do not have positive equity invested by the state or foreign 
investor. This excludes FDI, Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, and SOEs from the sample when we plot Figure 2. This is 
the main reason why the results presented in the graph are different from the common impression of TFP distribution 
in China. Coastal regions do on average have higher productivity but this is mainly due to the fact that many high 
productive FDI and Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures are located in coastal regions. 
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FDI presence in a locality will generate negative and significant impact on the productivity 
performance of domestic private firms in the same location. This result is robust to different 
spillover measures. 
  Many studies have addressed FDI spillovers in China. Using aggregate industrial data, Liu 
(2002) documents that FDI generates positive spillover impact on the productivity of manufacturing 
industries. Cheung and Lin (2003) find that FDI presence has positive impacts on the number of 
patent applications filed by indigenous firms in China. Lin et al. (2009) use both industry linkage 
and ownership structure to decompose FDI spillover from various sources. They find that spillovers 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT) firms are mainly negative while spillovers generated 
by non-HMT firms tend to be positive. At the aggregate level, these two opposing effects tend to 
offset each other. The same paper also documents strong and robust vertical spillovers. There are 
also a few studies look at FDI spillovers through geographical dimension. Using a cross-sectional 
firm level dataset from four provinces in Yangtze River Delta area in China, Tanaka and 
Hashiguchi (2012) document that FDI agglomeration generates stronger positive spillovers to 
domestic firms in nearby areas than in distance areas. Ouyang and Fu (2012) document that FDI 
concentrated in China’s coastal cities contributes to the growth of inland cities.  
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the empirical model, the 
data set and econometric issues. The empirical results can be found in Section 4. The final section 
concludes and suggests policy implications.  
 
[Insert FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 here] 
 
2. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 We employ the spatial dynamic panel regression model in equation (1) as the platform for our 
empirical analysis, where the spatial weights wij  are inversely proportional to the Euclidean 
distance dij  between two regions i  and j :  
 
TFPit = τTFPit−1 + ρ wijTFPjtj=1
N∑ + β1SOE _ presenceit + γ 1 wijSOE _ presencejtj=1
N∑
+β2FDI _ presenceit + γ 2 wijFDI _ presencejtj=1
N∑
+δ t +α i + ε it
  (1) 
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  i = 1,2,!,N    and    t = 1999,!,2007.  
 where 
 wij =
(dij )−1
0
if i ≠ j
if i = j
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
  (2) 
The dependent variable, regional TFPit  in (1), is a weighted average of the firm-level total factor 
productivity (in logarithm) of domestic private firms in region i  at time t , with the weights being 
the value added shares of the corresponding firms located in the underlying region in each year.4 
The spatial autoregressive term, ρ wijTFPjtj=1
N∑ , allows productivity spillovers among domestic 
firms which accounts for the productivity agglomeration pattern observed in the data. The temporal 
autoregressive term, τTFPit−1 , introduces dynamic adjustments into the model which allows the 
graduate diffusion of spillover effects over time. Domestic productivity in region i will be 
influenced by both intra- and inter-regional FDI presence, namely, FDI located in the same region 
FDI _ presenceit  and a weighted average of FDI located in neighboring regions
wijFDI _ presencejtj=1
N∑ . The parameters β2  and γ 2  measure intra- and inter-regional FDI 
spillover effect, respectively. Following the literature discussed above, we construct two proxies for 
FDI presence, namely, employment and sales income share of foreign firms in a region:  
 
_
 _  
 
FDI
it
it T
it
FDI
it
it T
it
EmploymentFDI Employment
Employment
Sales IncomeFDI Sales Income
Sales Income
=
=
  (3) 
where the superscript ‘T ’ refers to all firms (both domestic and foreign) in a region, and superscript 
‘FDI ’ refers to foreign firms only. These two proxies are expected to at least partially identify 
different channels of FDI spillovers, namely, (a) spillovers passing through workers (such as 
positive knowledge spillovers from labor market turnovers, learning-by-watching, imitation, etc. or 
negative spillovers from MNEs poaching local talents and bidding up local wages) and (b) 
spillovers passing through the product market (such as market stealing effect or competition effect). 
Since we cannot rule out multiple spillover effects, possibly of opposite sign, passing through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Appendix A reports details on variable construction and TFP estimation. 
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same channel at the same time, the current setup will only be able to capture the dominant or net 
effect.  
  In view of the prominence of the state-owned sector in China and its well-documented impact 
on the private sector, we also include the fixed asset share of state-owned enterprises in a region as 
an additional explanatory variable: 
 SOE _ presenceit =
Fixed  AssetitSOE
Fixed  AssetitT
  (4) 
 where superscripts ‘T  ’ and ‘ SOE ’ refer to all firms and state-owned firms respectively.5 Finally, 
with the aid of the panel data structure, we include two fixed effects to mitigate the problem of 
omitted variables. Time-specific fixed effect δ t  captures macroeconomic or policy events that have 
nationwide impact on productivity; and region-specific fixed effect α i  captures unmeasured local 
characteristics that explain productivity such as industry mix, institution, geography and education. 
  The spatial weight matrix W = [wij ]  parameterizes the structure of spatial dependence across 
the N  regions. We employ three different spatial weight matrices in our empirical analysis. The 
first one is a full matrix, which allows every region to be spatially connected to all other regions, 
i.e., non-zero input in all non-diagonal elements. The other two are truncated versions of the full 
matrix. We first partition the value of wij  (in ascending order) into 5 bins. We then construct two 
truncated matrices, namely, W c1 , of which only the weights of the closest 1/5 neighboring regions 
remain positive and the rest are truncated to zero, and W c2 , of which only the closest 3/5 
neighboring regions receive positive weights. For each FDI proxy (i.e. employment share or sales 
income share), we fit three separate spatial dynamic panel equations using each of W c1 , W c2 , and 
W . By doing so we are effectively using the geographic scope of spillover mechanism as 
identification condition. Hopefully this will help us further distinguish spillover effects that pass 
through the same channel (i.e. either employment share or sales income share). Following the 
literature discussed above, it is reasonable to expect different spillover mechanisms should have 
different geographic scopes. For example, negative spillovers due to poaching of local talents and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We include this variable as an independent variable as, apart from FDI, state owned firms would also have impact on 
domestic private firms. On the one hand, the investment by SOEs could enhance local capital accumulation and thus 
contribute to the agglomeration process. On the other hand, as documented in the literature (Bai et al., 2000; Bai et al., 
2004; Huang, 1998 and 2008; Huang et al, 2008), SOEs might generate crowding out effect, as well as create 
distortions in both input and output market (especially in financial market), which all have significant impact on 
private firms. Without controlling the impact of SOEs, our estimation results might suffer from omitted variable bias. 
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congestion pricing should have a more limited geographic scope, compared with knowledge 
spillovers through vertical linkage or imitation which should be less constrained by geographic 
distance.      
	  
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
  Data employed in this paper come from the annual census of above-size manufacturing firms 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China from 1998 to 2007 (known as the 
Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, NBS-CIE database henceforth). The database covers 
manufacturing firms with sales revenue over 5 million RMB. There are several indexes (including 
the China standard location indicator, district code, province code, city code, county code, as well 
as firms’ full address) which can help us to identify the location of a firm. Among all these indexes, 
province code, city code and county code are most completed and consistent over years. Measures 
specifying the distance between individual firms are not available. We hence define ‘region’ at  
county level in the empirical analysis. Consequently, all variables in this paper are aggregate county 
level data from an unbalanced panel data set with the number of regions ranging from 1343 in 1998 
to 2210 in 2007. The longitude and latitude coordinates of the counties are obtained from the 
GIVA-GIS database which are merged into the CIE database for producing the spatial weights.  
  Domestic private firm in this paper is defined as firms that do not receive paid-up capital from 
foreign investors or from any level of the Chinese government.6 Foreign firms are firms with 
positive foreign equity share in the sample.7 The dependent variable, total factor productivity at 
county level, is obtained by firstly estimating the total factor productivity at firm level and then 
aggregate them up to the county level. More specifically, we first estimate firm level TFP industry 
by industry using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method, which corrects for endogeneity bias in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This study does not attempt to address and evaluate the impact of FDI on the productivity of China’s state-owned 
enterprises. Bearing missions like stabilizing price and mitigating unemployment, it is not appropriate to model 
China’s state-owned enterprises have the same objective function as private firms. This issue may be investigated in 
future research. NBS-CIE database also reports registered ownership type which can also be used to identify firms’ 
ownership structure. In our paper, we identify FDI by using owner’s equity structure (paid-in capital) as we observe 
that in the databased there are firms with unchanged ownership type when their owner’s equity structure actually has 
changed. Defining FDI using owner’s equity structure thus is a better approach to reflect FDI penetration at firm level.	  
7 Summary statistics show that, among firms with positive foreign equity, most of them have foreign equity larger than 
10%. For instance, in 1998, 97% firms of this group have foreign equity larger than 10% (OECD definition of FDI) 
and 87% have foreign equity larger than 25% (FDI definied by Chinese law). In 2007, the numbers are 98% and 93% 
respectively. As firms with foreign share less than 10% (25%) only on average account for less than 5% (10%) of our 
sample, we believe that this difference will not lead to a significant change in our empirical results. 
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production function estimation arising from potential correlation between input levels and 
unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks. County level TFP is then constructed by calculating 
the weighted average firm level TFP in logritham, with the weights being the value added shares of 
the corresponding firms located in the underlying county in each year. In Appendix I, we provide 
further details on the description of data and variables, as well as the estimation procedure of TFP.  
  Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) advocate the use of the system-GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) to estimate the spatial dynamic panel model. In their 
Monte-Carlo experiments the system-GMM estimator outperforms various other spatial dynamic 
panel estimators in terms of bias, root mean squared error and standard error accuracy. Jacobs et al. 
(2009) confirm the conclusion of Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) in an independent Monte-Carlo 
study of the system-GMM estimator applied to the spatial dynamic panel model. They also 
document that the combination of collapsing the instrument matrix and limiting the lag depth of the 
dynamic instruments substantially reduces the finite sample bias in estimating the spatial lag 
parameter. In view of these recent developments in the econometric literature, we adopt the spatial 
system-GMM estimator as our estimation method in this study.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  Table 1 and 2 report empirical results based on two different proxies for FDI presence, i.e., 
sales income share and employment share, respectively. We also use different TFP measures as 
dependent variable to perform robustness check.8 As shown in both tables, both estimated temporal 
and spatial autoregressive coefficients are positive and significant under different model 
specifications, suggesting fairly strong temporal and spatial self-perpetuating pattern of productivity 
for domestic private firms at county level. These results are consistent with the explanatory data 
analyses reported in Figure 2. Positive spatial autoregressive coefficient indicates agglomeration 
pattern of indigenous firms’ TFP while positive temporal autoregressive coefficient reveals fairly 
persistent self-reinforcing trend of TFP over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The difference between TFP measures 1 and 2 are mainly due to using different capital series and deflators in the 
firm-level TFP estimation. For TFP measure 1 we use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of fixed 
assets as proxy for capital input, which is deflated by investment deflators obtained from various issues of Chinese 
Statistics Yearbook. For TFP measure 2, both capital input and deflator follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang 
(2012 and 2014). 
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  In Table 1, both intra- and inter-regional FDI spillovers are negative and significant across 
different model specifications. This suggests that negative pecuniary externalities from market 
stealing effect and congestion pricing seem to be dominant in both intra- and inter-regional 
dimensions when FDI presence is measured by sales income share. Note that when we gradually 
increase the number of neighbors by using different truncated spatial weight matrices, inter-regional 
spillovers captured by the estimated coefficient of spatially lagged FDI presence under TFP 
measure 1 decreases from -6.362 to -7.133, and further down to -13.093 when the spatial weight 
matrix is not truncated. The same pattern can be observed when TFP measure 2 is used in the 
regression. This result indicates that the intensity of pecuniary externalities increases when the 
range of neighboring regions expands. These negative pecuniary externalities seem to have wide 
geographic scope and outweigh other potential positive spillovers in both intra- and inter-regional 
dimensions. This could be due to the fact that the negative impact of market stealing or congestion 
pricing are magnified through inter-regional trade or industry linkages and spread onto a wider 
geographic scope; consequently, the positive spillovers captured by sales income share, if exist, 
seem to be dominated. 
  In Table 2, FDI presence is measured by employment share to capture potential positive 
knowledge spillovers from labour market turnovers as well as negative externality from MNEs 
poaching local talents. Empirical results show that intra-regional spillovers are negative and 
significant across different model specification, suggesting fairly strong negative effect of MNEs 
poaching local talents from indigenous firms in the same locality. The magnitude of inter-regional 
spillovers measured by the estimated coefficient of spatial lag FDI presence under TFP measure 1 
increase from -4.695 to -3.027, and further increase to 1.437 when the spatial weights matrix 
incorporates all neighbors. Very similar pattern is observed when we use alternative measure of 
TFP. This result reveals that, when FDI spillovers are measured by employment share, captured 
negative pecuniary externality and positive knowledge spillovers may have different geographic 
scopes. Negative pecuniary externalities tend to become dominant when only very close neighbors 
are incorporated in the analysis and thus have very local and narrow scope. Positive knowledge 
spillovers, however, become dominant when we expand the range of neighboring regions to 
incorporating more neighbors and thus have wider scope. 
    The presence of SOEs seems to generate significant and negative impacts on domestic firms in 
the same locality. This is consistent with the results documented in the literature. The presence of 
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SOEs tend to generate crowding out effect as well as distortions in both input and output market, 
which all have negative impact on domestic firms. The inter-regional impact of SOEs presence, 
however, are mostly positive and significant. The potential reason of this positive inter-regional 
effect might be that investment of SOEs in the neighbouring regions accelerate capital accumulation 
and thus contribute to the benefit of agglomeration process. Moreover, SOEs in China tend to focus 
on local regional market due to well-documented cellular structure of Chinese market, which could 
also be the reason that private firms are less affected by SOEs from neighbouring regions.    
Our empirical results document fairly strong evidence of substantial negative FDI spillovers 
along the spatial dimension, which calls for the rethinking of the commonly made presumption of 
beneficial spillovers from MNEs to nearby indigenous firms. By incorporating spatial dimension in 
the analysis, we are able to uncover the dominance of FDI negative spillovers and their scopes in 
space that have not been identified in conventional regression model in the FDI spillovers literature. 
Negative pecuniary externalities through market stealing effect and congestion pricing effect seem 
to have considerably wider scope as shown by the empirical results in Table 1. The second sources 
of negative pecuniary externalities come from MNEs poaching local talents from indigenous firms 
in the same locality. Nevertheless, this type of negative spillovers decrease with distance as 
suggested by the empirical results in Table 2. Potential benefit from FDI through knowledge 
spillovers are identified when we search for externalities from regions that are distance away. These 
results suggest that the benefit of indigenous firms locating close to MNEs may not be as large as 
commonly believed. Negative pecuniary externalities tend to dominate other potential positive 
externalities resulting in negative overall effect.  
	  
5. CONCLUSION 
Recent literature has reached the consensus that FDI spillovers do not occur uniformly and 
unconditionally. Empirical studies looking at the simple association between domestic firms’ 
productivity performance and FDI presence may only summarize the compounded effect resulting 
from various factors but hardly reveal the underlying mechanism. It is thus important to introduce 
extra dimension in the analysis so as to disentangle the FDI spillovers mechanism. This study 
incorporates spatial dimension and investigates the geographic extent of FDI spillovers based on a 
large panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms supplemented with GPS information down to 
county level. We employ spatial dynamic panel econometric techniques to uncover the spatial 
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extent of spillover diffusion. Our empirical results show that FDI presence in one county will 
generate negative spillovers to domestic private firms in the same locality. This result is robust to 
different proxies for FDI presence. We further document strong negative pecuniary externalities 
through market stealing effect and congestion pricing effect in inter-regional dimension. By 
gradually expanding the range of the spatial weights matrix, we also identify potential positive 
knowledge spillovers which tend to have wide geographic scope. 
Many developing countries including China have been providing incentive packages to 
encourage agglomeration among indigenous firms and MNEs. While the initial intention is to 
provide ‘learning by watching’ opportunity for domestic firms as well as promoting collaboration 
and knowledge sharing amont domestic and foreign firms, geographical concentration may at the 
same time enhance the occurrence of negative pecuniary externalities. Our empirical investigation 
reveals that FDI-induced negative pecuniary externalities may be substantially stronger than other 
potential positive externalities. The benefit of agglomeration among indigenous firms and MNEs 
may not be as large as commonly believed. Indigenous firms however can potentially benefit from 
knowledge spillovers from MNEs located distance away. The empirical results of this study thus 
calls for a re-evaluation of the potential outcomes of policy-driven clustering among indigenous 
firms and MNEs.  
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APPENIDX A: Data, Variable, and TFP Measure 
Data employed in this paper come from the annual census of above-size manufacturing firms 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China from 1998 to 2007 (known as the 
Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, NBS-CIE database henceforth). In a very detailed and 
thorough approach, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012 and 2014) address variables and 
data cleaning issues of NBS-CIE database. We closely follow the data cleaning strategy suggested 
by their studies and make use of their industry concordances as consistent industry identifier.9 We 
drop firms with employment (personal engaged) below 8 workers and with negative nominal capital 
stocks, paid-up capital, sales revenue, intermediate inputs, or employment. Nominal input and 
output variables reported in the NBS-CIE databased are deflated by input and output deflators at 2-
digit industry level (1998 = 100) provided in Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012 and 2014).  
The construction of real capital stock merits special attention. Firms in the databased do not 
report fixed investment. Fixed capital stock data are reported at original purchase prices and thus 
cannot be used directly in the TFP estimation. We thus construct two proxies for capital input: 1) 
We use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of fixed assets as proxy for capital input. 
This capital input proxy is deflated by the investment price index (1998 = 100) obtained from 
various issues of China Statistical Yearbook; 2) Following Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang 
(2012 and 2014), we convert estimates of capital stock at original purchase prices into real values 
that are comparable across time and firms. More specifically, we first make use of the capital stock 
data reported in 1993 annual enterprise survey and in 1998 NBS-CIE database to estimate average 
growth rate of the nominal capital stock between 1993 and 1998 at province by industry (2-digit) 
level. By using this estimated growth rate ( g ), which is different by industy and by year, together 
with capital stock at original purchase price ( fainitial ) and the firm’s age ( a ) we calculate the firm’s 
initial nominal capital stock (nk0 ) in the establishment year, 0 (1 )
ainitialnk fa g= + .10 The firm’s real 
capital stock  in the establishment year ( rk0 ) is obtained by deflating nk0  using investment deflator 
from Perkins and Rawski (2008). Nominal capital stock data after the establishment year is then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 There was a revision of industry classification of China in 2002. A concordance thus is needed to make industry 
identifier to be consistent across the sample period. 
10 Following Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012 and 2014), we assume that, for firms with establishment year 
earlier than 1978, their experience before 1978 have negligible impact on capital stock in 1998 and thus reset the 
establishment year for these firms to 1978.	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calculated by using the estimated growth rate ( g ). Assuming a 9% depreciation rate, the real capital 
stock data in 1998 (or the firm’s first year in the sample) is then calculated by using perpetual 
inventory method and Perkins and Rawski deflators. Real capital stock after 1998 (or after the 
firm’s first year in the sample) is calculated by following perpetual inventory method with 9% 
depreciation rate but use the difference in firm’s nominal capital stock measured at original 
purchase prices as fixed investment.  
The first step of our data analysis is to estimate the total factor productivity in logarithm, 
ln(TFP) , at firm level. The county-level TFPs  are constructed as the weighted average of firm-
level ln(TFP)s  with the weights being the value added shares of the firm in the underlying county 
and in each year. Specifically,  TFPit , for county i , in year t  is constructed as 
 TFPit =
vajit
vajitj∈i∑
ln(TFP) jit   
where vajit  denotes the year t  ’s value added for firm j  located in county i . 
A conventional way to estimate TFP is to apply ordinary least squares on Cobb-Douglas 
production function and use Solow residue as a measure of TFP. This approach, nevertheless, has 
been criticized by recent literature in that it does not handle the potential endogeneity problem 
arising from potential correlation between input levels and unobserved firm-specific productivity 
shocks. Firms make input decision after they observe their current productivity level; thus, the input 
variables are not exogenous variables. Without controlling for firms’ productivity, which is 
typically unavailable in most cases, OLS could result in bias in the production function regression 
and in TFP measure. To correct for endogeneity bias in production function estimation, Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) propose to use intermediate input as instrument in the estimation. This algorithm 
has now commonly adopted in the literature to handle the endogeneity bias problem in TFP 
estimation. We hence also employ this method in this paper. The followings provide a brief 
summary for Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) routine. 
Assume that, for a specific year t, firms in the same industry have the following production 
function (value added case): 
 vat = β0 + βllt + βkkt +wt +ηt    
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where vat , lt , kt , and wt  are firm’s value added, labor input, capital input, and productivity, 
respectively. All variables are in logarithm. ηt  is an error term and it is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with all input choices. Firms will make input decision based on their productivity; thus, productivity 
component is correlated to input choices. Data for wt  usually is not available; consequently, 
conventional method like OLS will lead to bias estimation, unless a proxy for productivity could be 
included in the regression as control variable. 
To construct a proxy for unobserved productivity, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) make the 
following assumptions: 1) Demand for the intermediate input, mt , is assumed to be depending on 
the firm’s state variable kt  and wt . More specifically, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) illustrate that 
demand mt  is a monotonous (increasing) function of wt , i.e., mt = mt (kt ,wt ) . Taking inversion of 
this intermediate demand function, we have wt = wt (kt ,mt ) . 2) Capital input, kt , is a state variable. 
Labor input, lt , is so-called freely variable input that firms are able to adjust when they observe 
current productivity shock. 3) Productivity, wt , follows a first-order Markov process, i.e., 
wt = E[wt wt−1]+ ξt , where ξt 	  is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt , but is 
allowed to be correlated with lt . In this paper, we follow the default LP algorithm and assume that 
lt  is uncorrelated with ξt . Given these assumptions, we have  
 
vat = β0 + βllt + βkkt +wt +ηt
= βllt +φt (kt ,mt )+ηt
  
where 
φt (kt ,mt ) = β0 + βkkt +wt (kt ,mt )  
The first step of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm is to estimate the above regression 
function by OLS and a third-order polynomial approximation in kt  and wt  is used as a proxy for 
unobserved productivity component, i.e., the first step regression function is 
 vat = δ 0 + βllt + δ ijktimtjj=0
3−i∑ +ηti=0
3∑  
A consistent estimate of βl , βˆl , is obtained after this step, given that lt  and ξt  are not correlated. 
We then have  φˆt = va! t − βˆllt  and wˆt = φˆt − βˆkkt . At this stage, it is suggested that βˆk  could take any 
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reasonable initial value, denoted as βk
*  (Petrin et al., 2004), i.e., wˆt = φˆt − βk*kt .11 Given these 
estimates, a consistent (nonparametric) approximation of E[wt wt−1] , denoted as  E[wt wt−1
! ]  could 
be obtained by using the predicted values from the following regression: 
 2 30 1 1 2 1 1 3( ) ( )t t t t tw w w wγ γ γ γ ε− − −= + + + +   
where both dependent and independent variables come from *ˆˆ t t k tw kφ β= − . Consequently, we have 
 ηt + ξt
! = vat − βˆllt − βk*kt − E[wt wt−1! ] .	   
The second and the final step is to use appropriate instruments to obtain consistent estimates for 
βˆk  based on  ηt + ξt
! = vat − βˆllt − βk*kt − E[wt wt−1! ] . It is assume that capital stock in the current 
period, tk , is determined by the previous investment decisions. Consequently, current capital stock 
does not respond to shocks to this period’s productivity innovation term ξt , which leads to the first 
moment condition [ ] 0t t tE kη ξ+ = . Note also that the previous period’s level of material input, 
1tm − , is uncorrelated with current period’s error term, i.e., 1[ ] 0t t tE mη ξ −+ = . Other possible 
moment conditions include 1[ ] 0t t tE lη ξ −+ = , 1[ ] 0t t tE kη ξ −+ = , and 2[ ] 0t t tE mη ξ −+ = . 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 We employ Stata command ‘levpet’ for production function estimation and TFP calculation. A two-dimensional grid 
search with candidate values for 𝛽!∗ range from 0.01 to 0.99, in increments of 0.01 are used in the algorithm.  
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TABLE 1 
Empirical Results 
 TFP Measure 1 TFP Measure 2 
 Truncated 
Matrix 1cW  
Truncated 
Matrix 2cW  
No truncation 
in W   
Truncated 
Matrix 1cW  
Truncated 
Matrix 2cW  
No truncation 
in W   
First order time lagged TFP 0.154** 0.192*** 0.160*** 0.790*** 0.750*** 0.778*** 
 (0.076) (0.044) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.082) 
SOE presence: fixed asset share -6.761*** -4.762*** -6.091*** 0.664 -0.728** -0.741*** 
 (1.223) (1.077) (0.782) (0.736) (0.302) (0.206) 
FDI presence: sales income share -9.343*** -8.350*** -9.010*** -1.340*** -0.477 -0.041 
 (0.897) (1.064) (0.851) (0.505) (0.422) (0.297) 
Spatially lagged TFP 0.147** 0.191* 0.256*** 0.454*** 0.632** 0.521** 
 (0.061) (0.099) (0.046) (0.122) (0.273) (0.216) 
Spatially lagged SOE presence: fixed asset share 3.239*** 3.550*** -1.205 2.370*** 4.841** 1.074 
 (0.754) (1.331) (1.440) (0.651) (2.110) (1.287) 
Spatially lagged FDI presence: sales income share -6.362** -7.133** -13.093*** -1.493** -2.463** -4.834* 
 (2.864) (3.174) (3.990) (0.583) (1.053) (2.611) 
Hansen Statistic 10.255 17.241 30.726 8.404 6.035 9.237 
Hansen Statistic p-value 0.923 0.244 0.629 0.816 0.812 0.600 
D.O.F of Hansen Statistic 18 14 34 13 10 11 
Number of Instruments 33 29 49 28 25 26 
N 8642 8642 8642 7513 7513 7513 
Notes: 
(a) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (b) Results reported are all two-step System-GMM estimates with Windmeijer (2005) correction for standard errors. (c) 
Collapsed instrument matrix technique is employed to reduce instrument count. (d) Hansen test statistics reported are two-step versions. (e) Truncated matrix 𝑊!! 
keeps the closest 1/5 neighbors and weights for other neighbors are truncated to zero entries. Truncated matrix 𝑊!! keeps the closest 3/5 neighbors. (f) Both TFP 
measure 1 and 2 are constructed by firstly estimate firm-level TFP using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm and then aggregate to county level using weighted 
average with the weight being the value added share of the firm in the underlying county. (g) The difference between TFP measure 1 and 2 are mainly due to using 
different capital input and deflators in the process of firm-level TFP estimation. For TFP measure 1 we use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of 
fixed assets as proxy for capital input, which is deflated by investment deflators obtained from various issues of Chinese Statistics Yearbook. For TFP measure 2, 
both capital input and deflator follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012 and 2014). Firms with missing or negative net capital stock at original purchase 
prices or with number of employee less than 8 are dropped before the estimation of TFP measure 2. This results in a smaller sample size. See Appendix A for 
further explanation. 
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TABLE 2 
Empirical Results 
 TFP Measure 1 TFP Measure 2 
 Truncated 
Matrix 1cW  
Truncated 
Matrix 2cW  
No truncation 
in W   
Truncated 
Matrix 1cW  
Truncated 
Matrix 2cW  
No truncation 
in W   
First order time lagged TFP 0.186** 0.201*** 0.143** 0.772*** 0.859*** 0.532*** 
 (0.080) (0.042) (0.063) (0.137) (0.113) (0.040) 
SOE presence: fixed asset share -6.108*** -4.335*** -6.717*** -3.379*** -0.678** -0.783*** 
 (1.345) (0.779) (0.978) (1.252) (0.269) (0.186) 
FDI presence: employment share -8.894*** -7.163*** -9.191*** -1.703*** 0.615 -0.635* 
 (0.782) (0.574) (0.944) (0.447) (0.436) (0.367) 
Spatially lagged TFP 0.132** 0.074** 0.146** 0.573** 0.506*** 0.662*** 
 (0.061) (0.037) (0.060) (0.233) (0.178) (0.145) 
Spatially lagged SOE presence: fixed asset share 1.896*** 2.913** -4.185 -0.052 2.554* -2.134 
 (0.268) (1.395) (2.566) (0.529) (1.415) (1.303) 
Spatially lagged FDI presence: employment share -4.695** -3.072 1.437 -2.488* -1.556*** 0.276 
 (2.105) (2.566) (4.422) (1.340) (0.578) (1.424) 
Hansen Statistic 13.117 27.495 19.492 5.211 10.944 30.365 
Hansen Statistic p-value 0.664 0.597 0.490 0.995 0.859 0.599 
D.O.F of Hansen Statistic 16 30 20 16 17 33 
Number of Instruments 31 45 35 31 32 48 
N 8642 8642 8642 7513 7513 7513 
Notes: 
(a) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (b) Results reported are all two-step System-GMM estimates with Windmeijer (2005) correction for standard errors. (c) 
Collapsed instrument matrix technique is employed to reduce instrument count. (d) Hansen test statistics reported are two-step versions. (e) Truncated matrix 𝑊!! keeps the closest 1/5 neighbors and weights for other neighbors are truncated to zero entries. Truncated matrix 𝑊!! keeps the closest 3/5 neighbors. (f) Both 
TFP measure 1 and 2 are constructed by firstly estimate firm-level TFP using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm and then aggregate to county level using 
weighted average with the weight being the value added share of the firm in the underlying county. (g) The difference between TFP measure 1 and 2 are mainly 
due to using different capital input and deflators in the process of firm-level TFP estimation. For TFP measure 1 we use the sum of average circulating capital 
and net value of fixed assets as proxy for capital input, which is deflated by investment deflators obtained from various issues of Chinese Statistics Yearbook. 
For TFP measure 2, both capital input and deflator follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012 and 2014). Firms with missing or negative net capital stock 
at original purchase prices or with number of employee less than 8 are dropped before the estimation of TFP measure 2. This results in a smaller sample size. See 
Appendix A for further explanation. 
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FIGURE 1 
FDI Spatial Density Distribution at County Level in 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database. FDI density is measured by fixed asset share of FDI in each county, i.e., the 
value of fixed asset of foreign firms divided by the total fixed asset in a county. The color code on the map indicates the classes of 
density, with the darkest color corresponding to the class of the highest density. 
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FIGURE 2 
TFP Spatial Distribution of Chinese Domestic Private Firms in 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database. County level TFPs are constructed as the weighted average of firm-level 
ln(TFP)s with the weights being the value added shares of the firm in the underlying county. The color code on the map indicates the 
level of TFP, with the darkest color corresponding to the class of the highest TFP. 
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